Lithuania finds the ways to maintain its energy security

Guest article written by Adomas Abromaitis, adomas333@inbox.lt The last political events once again highlighted the political relevance of energy security issue for Lithuania. We must pay tribute to the government that struggle for reducing Lithuania’s dependence on Russian energy supplies and for receiving financial support from its EU and NATO partners by all possible means. It finds new ways to attract international attention to the problem. The energy security issue for Lithuania has various aspects. One of them is insufficient funds for the dismantling work at Lithuania’s Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP). According to Audrius Kamienas, director of the Activity Planning and Finance Department at the INPP, another 900 million euros will be required starting in 2020. The government is continuing negotiations with EU in order to receive further financing of the project. Deputy Energy Minister Rokas Baliukovas said that active negotiations on additional EU funding for the Ignalina plant closure would start in 2017 to 2018. Kamienas said that 941 million euros had been used for the INPP closure by the start of 2016, with another 745 million euros in EU and national budget funds planned to be used by 2020. Self-financing of the project is impossible for the country and even partial funding has become an unbearable burden for the national budget. President Dalia Grybauskaite expects that Germany will support Lithuania in its efforts to raise concern about the safety of Belarus’ nuclear power plant under construction in Astravyets, some 50 kilometers from Vilnius. By the way, Belarus is the closest ally of Russia. Lithuanian government is not sure of the plant’s safety but can’t oppose the construction alone. So Lithuanian authorities follow a proven method by appealing to external help. Another aspect of maintaining Lithuanian energy security the government considers preventing construction of the Russian-German pipeline project Nord Stream 2. Being dependant on Russian energy supplies for the long time Lithuanian authorities think that it poses “risks for energy security not only to the country but to the region of Central and Eastern Europe on the whole.” Earlier, on 17 March, Prime Ministers and leaders of 9 EU member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia) had sent a letter to Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, speaking out against Nord Stream 2. But the matter is the EU is not directly involved in the decision-making process around Nord Stream 2: it is the national permitting authorities of the countries whose waters the pipeline will cross that must grant approval for the project. In this case, these are the permitting authorities of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on April 20 and tried to convince inefficiency of the project. However, if the German companies are able to defend their commercial interests, then the project will have a future. Taking into account the German pragmatism, economic expediency will prevail over the political one. Probably Germany does not pay so much attention to Russia’s threat as the Baltic States do. It should be said that Lithuanian authorities effectively use geopolitical situation in the region in order to reach national goals by attracting international attention and persuading its partners that Lithuanian problems are their problems either. One couldn’t judge Vilnius for it. Probably for the government of small country it is the simplest way. For example “threat from the West” made it possible for Lithuanian authorities to ask for NATO support in military and energy security spheres. The seventh meeting of the Steering Committee of Vilnius-based NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO ENSEC COE) took place on 19-20 April in Chalon-sur-Saône, France. In the meeting a lot of attention was dedicated to the protection of critical energy infrastructure and discussions on expansion of the Centre. NATO has assessed that the protection of critical energy infrastructure is one of the key elements for strengthening the Alliance’s resilience to hybrid threats. In this regard, Lithuania called on to increase funding for the centre’s activities in order to ensure necessary expertise in the field of the protection of critical energy infrastructure. Joining of new countries to the Centre (such as Germany and the US) will strengthen the capabilities of the structure and will made Lithuania more prominent in NATO and on the international arena. So the event allowed receiving additional political and financial support from external sources, such as NATO. Thus Lithuania today has at least two reliable ways of getting support in maintaining its energy security – from EU and NATO. It should be said that Vilnius uses such opportunities to reach national goals successfully.