The Security of the Baltic Sea and Baltic States Depends on Poland’s Pursuit of Long-Range Missiles  

This article was exclusively written for The European Sting by one of our passionate readers, Mr. Andrew Gardner, a strategic and international business consultant. The opinions expressed within reflect only the writer’s views and not necessarily The European Sting’s position on the issue.

Projecting a sign of strength in the Baltic Sea, Polish Minister of National Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz met with his Swedish counterpart, Pål Jonson, at the Gdynia Naval Base on March 12^th and said, “We will invest together in the defence industry and build the new security architecture in the Baltic Sea.”  

With the notable exception of Russia, the Baltic Sea is almost entirely surrounded by NATO countries following the recent NATO memberships of Finland and Sweden. Their inclusion adds Allied operational options and naval capabilities needed to defend this “NATO Lake” from Russia’s mighty military.  

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also visited Gdynia in February and claimed the port city, “is now becoming part of an important geopolitical project in the Baltic Sea, crucial for the security of Europe and Poland” and that Poland has “a real chance to dominate the Baltic Sea.” He heralded Poland’s recent purchase of 3 new Swedish A26 submarines to be delivered in 2030 under the Orka programme as proof of Poland’s “reborn maritime power” and “crucial” new partnerships.  

Poland’s recent awakening to the increased importance of European partnerships in light of America’s unreliability will be the key to its ability to pursue the offensive capabilities needed to protect its borders and the region.  

Drone Walls and Bunkers Won’t Scare Russia 

The Baltic Sea is home to critical seabed infrastructure (communication cables, pipelines) and heavy naval traffic, demonstrating its crucial economic interest for surrounding countries. It is also home to a little Russian exclave, Kaliningrad Oblast, that has gained strategic geopolitical and military importance for Russia with the war in Ukraine as the Russian’s Baltic fleet is located in its port and significant stocks of long-range missiles have been moved there as a warning to Europe.  

Kaliningrad also stands between the Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) and the rest of NATO. There is just a narrow strip of land, the Suwałki Gap or “NATO’s primary strategic vulnerability”, along the Polish-Lithuanian border that separates Russian ally Belarus from Kaliningrad. Polish President Karol Nawrocki and Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda inaugurated the Via Baltica last October along the pass and said, “the road was the region’s most important corridor and highlighted its role in the region’s defence.” 

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, Russia has been conducting acts of hybrid warfare in the Baltic Sea (damaged pipelines and cables), on Baltic States with drones and helium balloons entering their airspaces and on Poland as the target of a provocative simulated missile strike from Belarus last September. These are seen as precursors or tests for what NATO military and intelligence leaders agree is a likely aggression on NATO territory “in the near term”. Harvard’s Belfer Center believes Russia will likely take advantage of American military preoccupations to either “seize a small but symbolically significant area” in the Baltic States or cut them off from Allies by invading the Suwałki Gap. 

Because of this, Poland and the Baltic States, with financial and operational support from NATO/EU coalitions, have stepped up defensive initiatives. The Baltic Defence Line (BDL), announced by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2024 is building “bunkers, intelligent minefields, protected command nodes, anti-tank obstacles, and infrastructure designed for static defense” along borders with Russia and Belarus. Poland has invested USD2.5 billion over four years for a similar effort under its Eastern Shield 2024-2028 project. The EU is also beginning plans to build a “drone wall” for member nations that share borders with Russia.   

Whilst a positive sign of cooperation between countries, such efforts are unlikely to stop a Russian attack. Considering Russia’s missile production ramp-up and a lack of air defence systems in Baltic States and Poland’s heavy reliance on Patriot systems whose missiles are going to be in short supply following the Iranian conflict, Fabian Hoffmann argues that, “a denial-based missile defense strategy is therefore no longer viable. Europe should instead adopt a punishment-based conventional counterstrike strategy that deters Russia by demonstrating the ability to respond in kind to coercive or large-scale missile use.” To do so, stocks of long-range deep precision strike (DPS) missiles that can match Russia’s are urgently needed in the region.  

Baltic Security will Depend on Poland’s Offensive DPS Capabilities Across Domains 

Unfortunately, this burden falls on Poland’s shoulders because of its location and the fact that the Baltic States have significantly smaller economies and limited army capabilities despite significant efforts since 2022. “Our geostrategic location presents unique challenges. […] In this environment, a more proactive approach is essential. We need to send a clear message to Russia that any concentration of forces near the Polish or Estonian border will be met with a swift military response, targeting its logistics and critical infrastructure,” argued former Polish Chief of Defence Rajmund Andrzejczak. 

In 2024, the Polish Air Force ordered 1,000km-range American JASSM-ER missiles to be delivered by 2032. This order will likely be delayed as Bloomberg reported that following their use by US forces against Iran, only 425 JASSM-ER missiles “out of a prewar inventory of 2,300 will remain available for the rest of the globe.” This is compounded by the Trump administration’s new strategy issued in February for selling arms that puts American interests first and after having delayed orders of Patriots, HIMARS, missiles and ammunition to export customers in 2025 to prioritise American stockpiles. Such restrictions will also apply to the 1,000+ Tomahawk missiles used by American forces in Iran. 

Poland will have to find other options and luckily, they have already started. Considering any defence of the Suwałki Gap would entail a land contingent and “a successful counteroffensive would require sustained Allied forces to conduct long-range strikes deep into Russia,” meaning being launched over Belarus, Poland has pursued European collaboration to fill ground-launched DPS capabilities. In 2024, it joined France, Germany, the UK and Sweden to form the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) to collaborate on developing such weapons.  

Then, in July 2025, Deputy Minister of National Defence Paweł Bejda signed a letter of intent with French officials “for cooperation on land-based cruise missiles, signaling an expanding strategic defense partnership between the two countries.” This might have also signalled interest in the Land Cruise Missile (LCM) being developed by the French division of MBDA based on its 1400km MdCN naval missile, a potential for Poland’s new submarines. With testing for the ground-launched LCM expected for 2028, IISS reported that “France reportedly offered Poland industrial cooperation on all supporting equipment for the LCM LACM, excluding the missile itself which will be supplied from France.” Security cooperation with France just reached a new level following Macron’s visit to Poland’s port city of Gdansk in April and whilst a commitment to “…intensify our operational exchanges and industrial partnerships to support the development of European defence capabilities, including in the areas of… deep precision strike…” was made, no specific agreements regarding LCM or other projects were announced.   

Poland’s partnership with Sweden to protect the Baltic Sea is one step forward for securing the maritime environment, but a potential collaboration with France for ground-launched DPS capabilities could help Polish land forces secure the Suwałki Gap and borders with Kaliningrad and Belarus. As Matthew Day from TVP World argued, “Possessing that fearsome punch also has the key factor of deterrent. For Poland, which lies on NATO’s eastern flank, nestled against a rapacious Russia, the ability to deter a foe from even contemplating an attack has become a fundamental security objective.”