Is Germany Really Playing the European Defence Long Game?

This article was exclusively written for The European Sting by one of our passionate readers, Mr. Andrew Gardner, a strategic and international business consultant. The opinions expressed within reflect only the writer’s views and not necessarily The European Sting’s position on the issue.

Germany’s renewed enthusiasm to invest in defence is accompanied by political declarations promoting the rebuilding of Europe’s industrial sovereignty. However, beyond the rhetoric, the reality of the German government’s actions raises questions not about its budgetary commitments but about its sincerity in making Europe a priority.

With major increases in its defence and military budgets and pledges of European solidarity, Germany appears to be making strides towards a self-sufficient European defence, but its continued transatlantic purchases for major armaments threatens Europe’s ability to step out from under America’s umbrella.

In mid-July 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz met with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and signed a significant friendship treaty focused on mutual defence and security, including collaboration on “nuclear issues”. This so-called Kensington Treaty builds on defence cooperation laid out in last year’s UK-Germany Trinity House Agreement with, amongst others, coordination on defence exports for equipment made jointly such as the Typhoon Eurofighter jet (made by Britain’s BAE Systems and Airbus in Germany) and on defence industrial projects including plans to deliver a deep precision strike weapon within the next decade.

This type of long-term investment in Europe’s defence capabilities seems in line with Merz’s statement that his, “absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that we can achieve real independence from the USA step by step.” And yet, recent actions from Berlin contradict his claim and should alert Europe’s leaders that Germany might privilege transatlantic transactions at the expense of Europe’s long-term security needs when it serves its own interests.

Germany’s Reinforced Zeitenwende

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, then-chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Germany’s security and foreign policy would experience a major overhaul, or Zeitenwende, “signifying a turn of the times and a historical geopolitical shift.” A €100 billion extra-budgetary fund for boosting the country’s defence capabilities was established and with military expenditures of $76 billion in 2024, Germany became the world’s fourth-largest military spender.

Merz has taken this to a new level with his goal of making the Bundeswehr “the strongest conventional army in Europe”, saying this is “not to do the United States a favor — but because Russia actively threatens the freedom of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.” Defence Minister Boris Pistorius recently revealed plans to more than double the annual defence budget within the next four years to over €160 million, putting Germany on track to meet NATO’s goal for member states to increase military expenditures to 3.5% of GDP by 2029.

With sharp energy price increases and the country’s once-lustrous automobile industry now in disarray, Germany’s economy is in trouble. Some hope German defence manufacturers will be able to turn that around. The New York Times reports that almost half of the $137 billion Germany spent from 2020-2024 on military equipment went to German companies. Rheinmetall has been one of the main beneficiaries and the company’s market capitalization reached €91 billion in July, up from €4 billion in 2022. With investments in Germany and other European production facilities (Romania, Hungary, etc), Armin Papperger, the company’s chief executive, has big ambitions, but his ambitions also lie on the other side of the Atlantic.

The E3 Triangle Behind Europe’s Security

Given the colossal sums of money involved in military purchases and the often-lengthy production times, investments must be carefully studied to ensure each industrial project actually increases European capabilities in the long-run and doesn’t simply serve individual states’ interests.

This view, which governments increasingly share, has led some of them to collaborate on defence initiatives. In July 2024, the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) project was launched uniting France, Germany, Italy, and Poland, with the UK and Sweden later joining to develop purely-European deep precision strike capabilities. Potential models looking to be filled include Kongsberg’s Joint Strike Missile, based on NSM, or, for long-range capabilities (500-2,000 kilometres), MBDA’s Land Cruise Missile (LCM), but other lighthouse projects are also under development.

Plus, there is the burgeoning role in European security of the triangular relationship between Germany, France and the UK: the E3. The E3 is strengthened by bilateral treaties between the three members like the 2010 UK/French Lancaster House Agreement and its updated 2.0 version signed by Starmer and Macron on July 10^th. In it, they agree to continue working together on ELSA, but also to “launch the development phase of the Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) programme to provide the next generation of long-range, highly survivable deep strike missiles”. Another focus would also concern air and missile defence (IAMD) with an eye towards the SAMP/T NG and CAMM defence systems and buy new Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles.

Lancaster 2.0 was followed by Merz’s signing of the Kensington Treaty. Nicolai von Ondarza from Chatham House observes that, “These back-to-back visits symbolize and reinforce a return of the E3 group – France, Germany and the UK – as the driving force of European security.” The E3 has the potential to provide strong leadership for European defence, especially in light of Germany’s Zeitenwende, but only if the three allies can trust that joint projects are developed for the common (European) good and not just national interests. However, such confidence could be jeopardised by Germany’s ambiguous relations with the United States, which are likely to make it difficult for France and the United Kingdom to understand its position and give rise to mistrust.

Is Germany Really Walking the Walk?

Upon taking office, Merz told lawmakers that Germany had a leadership role to play in ensuring European security but, “We must rebuild our defence capabilities” and that defence contracts should be awarded to European firms “whenever possible.”

This is the kind of direction Europe needs, but actions from Berlin have shown a different prioritisation. Eyebrows were raised in July when Merz announced that the US would provide Ukraine with American-made weapons (Patriot systems) and Europe would pay for them – even though the Franco-Italian SAMP/T system could have been a viable European alternative.

This tendency to buy American seems to be par for the course with Germany. This includes its European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) that brings together some 20 European states to develop a multi-layered defence based on the US Patriot system, Israel’s Arrow 3 systems and Germany’s IRIS-T system. Germany is also in talks with American Lockheed Martin to purchase a Typhon missile system. Boris Pistorius says “This will enable Germany to significantly increase its own defence capability, and also to significantly increase its deterrence capability, as well as that of Europe,” but observers argue that delivery might not be as soon as promised and more importantly, it could put the ELSA initiative and its most advanced projects in jeopardy.

Recent moves from Rheinmetall should also be scrutinised. Germany just ordered 35 new F-35 jets from Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman that will be assembled at Rheinmetall’s new factory in Weeze, Germany. The parts might be put together in Europe, but the technology is American. Rheinmetall also recently created a partnership with Anduril, an American defence tech group, to bring Anduril’s Barracuda and Fury aerial drones to Europe. Mr. Papperger claims, “We have not seen any negative effects of the Trump administration. If you make America great again, then you are very welcome.” France and Britain should be wary of such statements and ready to push back when Germany doesn’t give preference to European manufacturers.

Europe for Europe

For European leaders that are serious about building European defence capabilities and developing the European Defence Technology Industrial Base (EDTIB), alarm bells should be sounding following Berlin’s mixed signals – especially for those pushing the ‘buy European for European security’ agenda.

EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius argues, “450 million European Union citizens should not have to depend on 340 million Americans to defend ourselves.” And on the eve of President Trump’s inauguration, President Macron told top military brass, “We can’t raise debt together, spend more for our defence to subsidise the industry, wealth, and jobs of other continents.”

And perhaps the best summation comes from Donald Tusk, Poland’s Prime Minister. Addressing EU lawmakers, he said, “Ask not of America what it can do for our security. Ask yourselves what we can do for our own security.” European defence capabilities are being developed through initiatives and treaties such as ELSA, Lancaster 2.0, ASAP, E3, etc., but Germany’s significant transatlantic investments risk killing these efforts before they reach fruition.

About the author

Andrew Gardner is a strategic and international business consultant, advising organisations on growth, market entry, and global development. Expert in market analysis and partnership management, dedicated to driving transformational change for complex organisations. Previously a civil servant within Defence administration, possessing deep insight into public sector challenges and operational excellence.