Most European Countries are not yet Prioritising European-Made Arms 

This article was exclusively written for The European Sting by one of our passionate readers, Mr. Andrew Gardner, a strategic and international business consultant. The opinions expressed within reflect only the writer’s views and not necessarily The European Sting’s position on the issue.

In October 2025, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) was approved by the European Parliament and EU governments, which Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chairwoman of the EP’s security and defence committee, hopes will  “…incentivise EU member states to boost joint procurement in order to build common European defence capabilities – stronger, strategic, efficient and united.” 

With only €1.5 billion budgeted from 2025-2027, EDIP’s impact might be small, but with an ‘EU-made content’ rule of 65%, the message is clear for boosting Europe’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB). EDIP complements other initiatives underway, most notably €800 billion mobilised (national escape clause activation and SAFE loans with 65% European-made content rules) under the Readiness 2030 initiative introduced last March to address defence capability gaps identified in the White Paper for European Defence. Andrius Kubilius, Commissioner for Defence and Space, asserted, “It [defence readiness] demands an urgent ramp-up and a longer-term strategy how to replace American capabilities in Europe… there is an urgent need of strong political will of national governments to spend more on defence, to spend in joint development and joint procurement and to spend European.”  

Recent crises (Ukraine and now Greenland) show the risks of excessive dependence on external capacities. There seems to be general consensus for strengthening the EDITB for reasons of military and industrial sovereignty, as well as job creation, but not everyone is acting accordingly. This is concerning as European solutions exist and American (and other foreign) products come with drawbacks, most notably: sovereignty infringements, quality issues, and quantity/delivery limitations. 

Europe First? 

Most European nations still turn towards foreign products for various reasons: because they prefer the technology, governments are used to doing so for diplomatic reasons, national industry cannot meet needs, belief that deliveries will be quicker or concerns about switching to new suppliers’ systems and technology.  

European orders (mainly Romania, Germany, Denmark and Estonia for drones, electronic systems, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, etc.) represented 54% of Israeli defence exports in 2024, up from 35% in 2023. South Korea’s sales to Europe increased in 2025 and in 2024, 46% of its defence exports went to Poland. But the lion’s share of Europe’s imports come from Washington.  

American defence companies sell products through the US Foreign Military Sales programme (FMS) and analysis from Bruegel shows FMS contracts with Europe reached $68 billion in 2024. They argue that “The dependence is particularly significant for high-tech equipment, including air defence, missiles and fighter jets, and for additional equipment and services included in purchases, such as advanced software and sustainment and modernisation required in future years.” From 2022-2024, 51% of Europe’s military spending went to U.S. weapons, but author Juan Mejino-López warns, “There are lock-in effects when you buy U.S. equipment — you have to keep buying missiles, software, radars and other IT equipment for decades.”  

Arms Imports 

Ukraine relies on American ground-based weapons but learned they come with controls. ATACMS missiles were delivered with reduced ranges and since spring 2025, their use has been subject to case-by-case U.S. approval with at least one request denied. Europe also imports tactical long-range missiles with Poland, Romania and Baltic States recently ordering American HIMARS rocket launchers and ATACMS missiles. In April 2024, Artur Kuptel, head of the Polish State Armament Agency, signed a $1.64 billion deal with South Korean Hanwha Aerospace for Chunmoo multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). To respond to this need with sovereign solutions, France will test European MLRS proposals from Safran/MBDA and Thales/ArianeGroup in 2026.  

Ukraine has also shown that modern warfare requires long-range deep precision strike capabilities (beyond the tactical level) that provide operational utility and deterrence. To that end, Germany revealed €1.37 billion plans to purchase Typhon launchers and 400 Tomahawk Block Vb land-attack missiles, which Ukraine had unsuccessfully requested. However, Tomahawks were just tested for ground-launch in 2024 (previously sea-launched) and there are currently only two active Typhon batteries capable of firing them. Trump said, “the only way a Tomahawk will be fired is if we fire it.” Raytheon is backlogged with Tomahawk orders for other countries (Japan/Australia) so Berlin probably won’t receive them until after 2028.  

Meanwhile, pan-European MBDA is developing a ‘European Tomahawk,’ called the Land Cruise Missile (LCM), evolved from its battle-successful Naval Cruise Missile (MdCN). LCM will be ground-launched with a 1,000+ km range and should be tested in 2027. Denmark has announced plans to purchase long-range, ground-launched weapons and might consider this upcoming European sovereign option, free of Washington’s control. 

Fighter planes are a big-ticket item, and since Russia’s invasion, 75% of Lockheed Martin’s orders for F-35s come from Europe including Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK. However, some nations (Spain, Switzerland, Portugal) are reconsidering or cancelling orders over issues of sovereignty, high maintenance/sustainment costs, software and hardware problems causing delayed deliveries, and “citing ‘disastrous’ cost overruns, poor mission-capable rates (51% in 2023), and a U.S. ‘monopoly’ on ‘black box’ software, parts, and mission data.” Spain and France have prioritised European projects including FCAS and the new F5 “Super Rafale” standard. Others might soon follow as concerns increase that “U.S. controls software, upgrades, and operational data, potentially giving it indirect control over allied operations through its ability to restrict access to parts and maintenance.” 

Air defence systems have become a European priority as Ukraine has relied heavily on American Patriot systems. Switzerland ordered five Patriot systems in 2022, but must now wait because the U.S. DOD informed Bern that, “it will reprioritize the delivery of Patriot systems to support Ukraine.” Denmark was also considering acquiring Patriot systems, but instead selected the French-Italian long-range SAMP/T system and a medium-range IRIS-T system from Germany’s Diehl Defence.  

Unsustainable Foreign Dependence 

Geopolitical priorities are shifting worldwide, and Europe cannot ‘peacefully’ rely on outside suppliers. When Israel began operations in Gaza, Israeli defence companies delayed $1.5 billion of deliveries to global customers – Seoul could do the same if North Korea or China start mobilising. The Pentagon recently announced that the U.S. will provide “more limited” support to allies even as the world wonders who the U.S. now considers an ally.  

Plus, as Camille Grand, policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, observes, “There is misperception in Europe that the US is a gigantic Walmart with everything available off the shelf. The reality, and especially for complex weapons, is that you end up in a queue… You’re not only competing with other European customers, but you’re also competing with the American customer, which always gets priority, and you’re competing with the Israelis, the Saudis, the Emirates, the Asian market.” 

Continuing to shop overseas means the EDITB loses orders for current products or projects under development, thus reducing production, losing out on job creation and potentially threatening innovative European-sovereign technologies. Whilst the saying ‘old habits die hard’ is true, ‘buying European’ and strengthening the EDITB so it can meet Europe’s defence needs is the only way to end foreign dependence.